In the APSA Public Scholarship Program, graduate students in political science produce summaries of new research in the American Political Science Review. This piece, written by Deborah Saki, covers the new article by Daniel Steven Smith, Ohio State University, “Storm from the Steppes: Warfare and Succession Institutions in Pre-Modern Eurasia, 1000–1799 CE”.
In many history books, constant wars in old Europe forced kings to build better governments, which included central offices, reliable taxes, loyal armies, and stable rules for passing power. This helped European states survive invasions, grow stronger, and lay the foundation for modern nations. Countries that failed to adapt usually got conquered. This explanation comes mostly from Europe’s experience. But when you look at the full sweep of Eurasia (Europe plus most of Asia) from 1000 to 1799, the story looks very different. Why did some regions end up with long, secure rulers who could steadily build strong institutions, while others suffered short, violent reigns and much weaker states over time?
This question sits at the center of a recent article by Daniel Steven Smith. The study shows that low rates of long, stable rule were not mainly about culture or random chance. Instead, they were shaped by the dominant style of warfare across much of medieval and early modern Eurasia, and how that warfare interacted with rules for choosing the next ruler.
One type of warfare examined in this paper is the Inner Asian cavalry warfare (IACW). This kind of warfare involves fast horse armies from the vast steppe grasslands of Central Asia. It was the main way large-scale fighting happened in many parts of the continent. This style rewarded rulers who were personally tough, skilled fighters and coalition-builders. It favored succession rules that picked the strongest adult warrior (often through fights among brothers or relatives) rather than smooth father-to-son handovers. Father-to-son (FS) succession (especially primogeniture, where the oldest son inherits everything) worked the opposite way. It named a clear (usually young) heir, reduced fights among elites, lowered the risk of being overthrown, and let rulers stay in power much longer.
Long, secure reigns brought big advantages such as time to invest in government offices, better taxes, loyal armies, economic growth, fewer civil wars, and stronger defenses against outsiders. Over time, father-to-son rules of succession became normal in most major Western European states by around 1300 and helped them consolidate power and build stronger institutions. However, these rules did not survive everywhere they appeared. In the Middle East, India, and other regions closer to the Inner Asian steppe, father-to-son succession was often disrupted, replaced, or never fully entrenched. Smith argues that the key factor behind this divergence is proximity to Inner Asia, the vast zone where horse nomads lived and launched repeated conquests. In areas that were close to, or repeatedly attacked by, Inner Asian cavalry armies, rulers faced a harsh reality: survival often depended on having a proven warrior-king ready immediately, which made a young, untested heir a serious liability.
“These findings show that succession rules and state-building were deeply shaped by geography and by the dominant style of warfare that societies had to confront.”To support these claims, the study draws on a large and carefully assembled body of evidence. Smith builds a new dataset covering more than 300 Eurasian ruling families between 1000 and 1799 CE, using historical records on rulers, reign lengths, and succession practices. He then links these dynasties to spatial data to measure each one’s shortest border distance to Inner Asia, and codes how much they relied on Inner Asian cavalry warfare based on army composition and historical descriptions. The analysis also incorporates information on exposure to cavalry-heavy battles and on conquests that replaced one dynasty with another.
Statistical models test whether distance from Inner Asia, reliance on Inner Asian cavalry warfare, and exposure to steppe-style conflicts are associated with lower use of father-to-son succession and a higher chance of overthrow than those that relied on hereditary rule. Several cases from China and North India make the argument more concrete.
These findings show that succession rules and state-building were deeply shaped by geography and by the dominant style of warfare that societies had to confront. Europe’s trajectory toward long-ruling kings and robust institutions was not just a product of “European” values or ideas, but also of its location, farther from the storm of Inner Asian horse armies that repeatedly disrupted secure, long-term rule across much of Eurasia. Seeing Europe in this wider Eurasian context helps explain why similar political advantages emerged in some regions but were eroded in others, and why Europe’s path to strong, stable states ended up looking so distinctive.
- Deborah Saki is a PhD candidate in political science at Georgia State University. Her research focuses on post-conflict governance, ethnic recognition, and nation-building in post-conflict states. She is currently an Elinor Ostrom Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. She has previously worked in communications for the World Affairs Council of Atlanta. She enjoys public facing writing, with her work appearing in Inside Higher Ed, Times Higher Ed, and other publications.
- SMITH, DANIEL STEVEN. 2025. “Storm from the Steppes: Warfare and Succession Institutions in Pre-Modern Eurasia, 1000–1799 CE.”, American Political Science Review, 1–18.
- About the APSA Public Scholarship Program.
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