Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa

Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa

By Max Gallien, The London School of Economics

Contemporary writing on North African borderlands invokes the idea of a general, unregulated porosity through which small-scale informal traders of food or textiles move alongside drug smugglers and terrorists. I challenge that conception, demonstrating that the vast majority of smuggling activity is in fact highly regulated through a dense network of informal institutions that determine the costs, quantity, and types of goods that can pass through certain nodes, typically segmenting licit from illicit goods.

While informal, the institutions regulating this trade are largely impersonal and contain third-party enforcement, hence providing a direct empirical challenge to common characterisations of informal institutions in political science. I argue that revisiting the characteristics associated with informal institutions, and understanding them as contingent on their political environment, can provide a new starting point for studying institutions, the politics of informality, state capacity, and the regulation of illegal economies.

1 Comment

  1. i want to thanks APSA for all efforts in the political learning in general and specially i look for the relations between the military sciences and the state politics studies.thanks from algeria

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