In the APSA Public Scholarship Program, graduate students in political science produce summaries of new research in the American Political Science Review. This piece, written by Anntiana Maral Sabeti, covers the new research letter by Connor Huff, Rice University, “Counterinsurgency Tactics, Rebel Grievances, and Who Keeps Fighting.”
What makes rebels keep on fighting? After the conflict has begun, when protests have turned to violent clashes with the state and lives begin to be lost, what keeps civilians turned rebels in the fight?
Romanticized arguments would allude to Mark Twain’s adage of the size of the fight in the dog. However, the size of this fight is likely to depend on how aggrieved a fighter feels, and the higher their level of grievance, the more likely dissidents are to persist in sparring against the government. And although the argument that grievance motivates people to mobilize into rebels has been tricky to demonstrate empirically, its logic still resonates and makes it a salient justification for rebel behavior.
Thus far political scientists have investigated how government actions leading up to a conflict may cause a rebellion by cultivating grievance amongst civilians who then transform into rebels. But researchers are yet to take into consideration how government conduct during conflict affects rebel behavior. The behavior of governments during conflict – or how it reacts to rebels and their uprisings – matters and warrants research because it too can be a source of grievance for rebels. Particularly violent counterinsurgency tactics such as indiscriminate killing and torture could fuel – rather than muffle – rebel activity. Under this rationale, Connor Huff evaluates how government tactics shape the behavior of rebels when it comes to keeping up or laying down arms in his recent research letter for APSR.
Whether by determination, cunning, or luck, Huff finds a dataset impeccably befitting this question. In the 1930s, the newly formed government of the Irish Free State passed legislation that made rebels who fought in the Irish War of Independence eligible for military pensions. To receive the pension, fighters had to submit applications that detailed the service, its length, and provide references confirming their military service in the rebel army. Serendipitously, these declarations and witness corroborations also recorded whether individuals were detained or interned by the British government during their military service, making it ideal for testing whether the internment of Irish rebels by the British government discouraged or encouraged these rebels to continue fighting upon their release.
Through accessing pension records, Huff finds 1,770 rebels who received their Military Service Certificates for their time in the Irish War of Independence. Of these soldiers, 1,162 were detained or imprisoned and 608 were not. He also takes into consideration other variables that might explain why rebels might return to combat after internment, such as joining the rebel movement early on in its inception (1913-1914), being a leader versus a rank-and-file soldier and being a member of the volunteer or citizen’s army.
Huff finds that Irish soldiers who were imprisoned by the British were more likely to fight in more segments of the war and more than 8% likely to fight for its entirety. This rededication to the rebel’s cause is likely a result of the poor conditions and treatment of prisoners during their internment. While intended to discourage rebellious activity, these counterinsurgency tactics stimulate and revive anti-government sentiments within rebels. They also reduce the cost of military participation as rebels have already been detained and labeled as agents against the British government, limiting alternative professional vocations after release and increasing the appeal of rejoining the army.
Ultimately, Huff finds that government repression against rebels does little to quell their dissent. Instead, the results support the logic that imprisonment incubates grievance within rebels which only reinforces their willingness to fight.
“Repressive tactics as imprisonment and torture may seem the more powerful tools for containing fighters and discouraging movements, but they will not achieve this outcome in the long durée” Governments generally have two courses of action when it comes to interaction with rebels: conceding to their demands or repressing their movements. Deciding which method to employ, when and to what degree is a nuanced calculation for states scrambling to maintain power. At the same time, this decision is very consequential as it can invoke a reaction from individual rebels who are weighing their options for the future. A miscalculation by a level-headed government or an exaggerated counterinsurgency protocol by an obstinate government that refuses to grant an ounce of concession could provide an advantage for anti-government movements. As Huff shows, such actions may serve to boost rebel armies. In fact, internment might be the best propaganda anti-government rebel armies could hope for, serving to motivate combatants and make future participation less costly and more appealing – they have already been branded as rebels, after all.
Governments concerned with retaining power in civil war should pay keen attention to the tactics they use. Repressive tactics as imprisonment and torture may seem the more powerful tools for containing fighters and discouraging movements, but they will not achieve this outcome in the long durée. Once released, former prisoners of war will be much more likely to rejoin the rebel army and fight for the entire duration of the war. To prevent this, governments should revest the power of conceding to rebel wishes in order to retain power.
- Anntiana Maral Sabeti is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. Her research is positioned in the space of gender, peace, and conflict. Her dissertation considers how and why IOs and NGOs will choose to include or exclude women and gender in peacebuilding operations.
- HUFF, CONNOR. 2023. “Counterinsurgency Tactics, Rebel Grievances, and Who Keeps Fighting.” American Political Science Review, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000059 American Political Science Review, 1–17
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