Co-sponsored by Division 44: Democracy and Autocracy
Roundtable with Virtual Participation
Participants:
- (Chair) Matthew Rhodes-Purdy, Clemson University
- (Presenter) Sheri Berman, Barnard College, Columbia University
- (Presenter) Frances E. Lee, Princeton University
- (Presenter) Fernando Rosenblatt, University of Manchester
- (Presenter) Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University
- (Presenter) Kurt Weyland, University of Texas at Austin
Session Description:
The recent rise of populism across developing and developed countries questions the common sense that liberal democracy was safe as “the only game in town.” As populism began to proliferate post-2008, many dismissed it as a temporary pathology of the historical moment, not a genuine alternative to democracy or as a phenomenon circumscribed to developing countries of weak democracies. The spread of personalistic populism long after the crisis abated, and its appearance in new forms (i.e. among the Populist Radical Right), raises the possibility that it might have a long-term effect on democracies. Under procedural conceptions of democracy, democratic institutions have intrinsic value, independent of the substance of social conflict and its outcomes, because they allow a peaceful mechanism for resolving these conflicts and addressing collective problems. Populist leaders question democratic institutions by claiming that they suffer from representational deficits and the incapacity or unwillingness of selfish elites to promote “the will of the people.” Public disenchantment with democratic institutions might seem increasingly drawn to this alternative. The purpose of this roundtable is to question, critique, and contemplate the long-term effects of populism on democratic order. Our main questions are: Does plebiscitarian populism have a point? Have states and social scientists given too much priority to orderly procedures and democratic survival, at the expense of effective conflict resolution through determined policy change? Do procedural conceptions of democracy, including how we measure and categorize countries as democratic or nondemocratic, need to change to better balance effectiveness with liberal rules? What are the future implications of plebiscitarian populism for democracy when we consider not liberal protections or stability, but effective problem solving? If, as has been historically typical, plebiscitarians cause far more problems than they solve, will mass publics eventually tire of plebiscitarian alternatives? Or are we more likely to see the damage done by today’s populist become the stepping stone for tomorrow’s new populist?
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