In the APSA Public Scholarship Program, graduate students in political science produce summaries of new research in the American Political Science Review. This piece, written by Dirck de Kleer, covers the new article by David Szakonyi, George Washington University, “Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia.”
In 2018, Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation used different data sources to reveal that Russian Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky drove two Bentleys and a Mercedes-Benz on an official annual income of roughly $30,000. In a new APSR article, David Szakonyi uses similar cross-referencing techniques to uncover corrupt deputies and shows how they do (or rather don’t do) their job in the Duma.
We have many ideas about how and when politicians engage in corruption. We know surprisingly less about how it affects their job performance. Szakonyi shows that corrupt deputies, measured as those with hidden wealth or assets, spend less time on their jobs; they show up less for votes, sponsor fewer bills, and ask fewer questions than other deputies. The time these deputies spend on self-enrichment distracts them from their official duties as a deputy.
However, engaging in corrupt behavior also poses a trade-off, because their self-enrichment leads to a pile of compromising information, or “kompromat.” The autocratic regime can use this information against these “kompromat deputies”, lest they fall out of line with the regime’s preferred political course. Corrupt opposition members, therefore, provide cover for themselves by voting in line with the regime.
Then there is also the risk that corruption is exposed, such as Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation investigation of Slutsky. Szakonyi shows that kompromat deputies are less likely to seek re-election and have shorter careers than other deputies. This can be likened to “revolving-door” politics, where corrupt deputies are rotated in and out at a fast pace. This may save political parties from the embarrassment of corruption scandals.
So, who are these corrupt politicians? To identify them, Szakonyi first collected data on all 1,034 deputies in the Russian State Duma from 2007 to 2021 as well as their annual income and asset disclosures. These forms were introduced in 2008 when the Russian government began requiring top officials to file extensive financial disclosures each spring. Most disclosures are classified, but a small portion of them are made publicly and aggregated through Transparency International- Russia’s (TI-R) Declarator Project.
To validate these disclosures, Szakonyi followed a technique pioneered by economists and Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. First, he gathered data from a large online car marketplace to assign values to every car that appeared in the disclosures. Next,
“By showing how corruption changes legislative and voting behavior, Szakonyi’s article helps us better understand how corruption works in countries like Russia.” Szakonyi searched for the top 19 of luxury car brands in the Russian Union of Auto Insurers (RCA) registry and put together a very large dataset of owners and drivers. He supplemented this with leaked insurance data from the Moscow and Moscow Oblast Traffic Agencies.
These data combined show that a quarter of the deputies in the Duma hid their wealth. These “kompromat deputies” either held back information about having one or more luxury cars or could obviously not afford them based on their disclosed family income alone, which means that they likely received bribes or other side-payments. Since this large group of Kompromats shirks responsibilities, have short-lived political careers, and (its opposition members) vote in line with the regime’s preference, we can conclude that corruption has large governance costs.
By showing how corruption changes legislative and voting behavior, Szakonyi’s article helps us better understand how corruption works in countries like Russia. His cross-referencing technique also makes a methodological contribution. When studying corruption, disclosures alone may not be enough to uncover self-enrichment. After all, officials can hide information. Cross-referencing these disclosures with other data can be a helpful tool to uncover incidences of corruption in settings that are more difficult to study.
- Dirck de Kleer is a PhD student in Social and Political Science at Bocconi University (Italy), where he studies political behavior and public opinion. His research focuses on understanding how citizens and politicians navigate the boundaries between moderate and extreme political attitudes and behaviors. In other work, he explores the implications of far-right parties in government. He holds an MA from Duke University, where he was a Fulbright Graduate Student (2018-2020).
- Article details: SZAKONYI DAVID . 2024. “Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia.” American Political Science Review, 1-18.
- About the APSA Public Scholarship Program.